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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK W. DALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH STATE 
BOARD OF PARDONS, and THE UTAH 
STATE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY 
REVIEW BOARD, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 930722-CA 
Priority No. 3 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional 
provisions are relevant to a determination of this matter, and are 
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16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) 
16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990) 
77-16a-203(3)(a) (effective July 1, 1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13, 1990) 
U.R.Cr.P. 21.5 (1989) (effective until July 1, 1989) 
U.R.Cr.P. 21.5 (1993) (effective July 1, 1989) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The procedural posture of this case is in the nature of 
an appellate review of an administrative agency's determination. 
The following standard applies to this appeal as a whole: 
Under Rule 65B, this court looks at the administrative 
proceeding as if the petition were brought here directly, 
even though technically it is the district court's 
decision that is being appealed. Since the review 
performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a 
review of the entire record, it is the same review that 
would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a 
direct appeal. We give no deference to the district 
court's initial appellate review since it is a review of 
the record, which this court is just as capable of 
reviewing as the district court. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 
1991) (citations omitted). 
The following individual issues and standards are 
presented: 
1. Whether the PSRB's transfer of Mr. Dall under a 
"maximum benefit from treatment" standard operates as an illegal 
application of an ex post facto law in violation of Article I, 
section 18 of the Utah Constitution and Article I, section 10, 
clause 1 of the United States Constitution, and whether that 
standard is arbitrary and capricious? 
Standard of review. This is a legal question and should 
be determined by the court without deference. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 
2 
796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah App. 1990); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 
586 n. 1 (Utah 1982). 
2. If the "maximum benefit" standard applies to Mr. 
Dall, whether the PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum 
benefit from treatment is adequately supported by the record? 
Standard of Review. To challenge a finding of an 
administrative body, appellant must marshal the evidence in support 
of the finding and show that the challenged finding is so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making it erroneous. Smallwood v. Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 
718-9 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Whether transfer of Mr. Dall to the Board of Pardons 
would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution and the eighth 
amendment to the United States Constitution? 
Standard of review. See standard for issue no. 1 
(question of law reviewed for correctness). 
4. Whether the PSRB's transfer of Mr. Dall to the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons constitutes an executive 
branch exercise of a power reserved to the judicial branch of 
government in violation of Article V, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
Standard of review. See standard for issue no. 1 
(question of law reviewed for correctness). 
5. Whether the lack of the right to appeal from orders 
of the PSRB violates Mr. Dall's right to due process under Article 
3 
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution, and his right to 
appeal under Article I, section 12 and Article VIII, section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of review. See standard for issue no. 1 
(question of law reviewed for correctness). 
6. Whether denying Mr. Dall compulsory process and 
monies to present his case through expert witnesses violates Mr. 
Dall's rights under Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution? 
Standard of review. See standard for issue no. 1 
(question of law reviewed for correctness). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Dall pled guilty and mentally ill to Forcible Sexual 
Abuse, a second degree felony, and Kidnapping, a second degree 
felony, on May 9, 1989. Judge Timothy R. Hanson sentenced Mr. Dall 
by order dated August 10, 1989 to concurrent terms of 1 to 15 
years, ordered him to the State Hospital and, as required by recent 
statutory changes, committed him to the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB"). 
Effective March 13, 1990 the legislature enacted the 
"maximum benefit" standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5. At the 
same time, the legislature eliminated appeals from PSRB orders 
except for those found not guilty by reason of insanity. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38-2(6). 
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In April and June of 1991, the PSRB held hearings to 
determine if Mr. Dall had received the maximum benefit of 
treatment, and entered orders finding that he had. See Exhibits 9 
(May 24 order, attached as Addendum B) and 10 (July 2, 1991 order, 
attached as Addendum C) . Mr. Dall appealed1 and simultaneously 
filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. R. la-5.2 The 
trial court denied the petition. See R. 492-500 (signed minute 
entry), R. 568-575 (findings and conclusions). The court denied 
Mr. Dall's post judgment motion for stay pending appeal, id., as 
did this Court. Mr. Dall is incarcerated in general population at 
the prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
CHARGES 
On July 12, 1988, Kirk Dall was charged by way of 
Information with Aggravated Sexual Assault, a first degree felony, 
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony, and Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony. The information alleged that Mr. 
Dall kidnapped, raped, and robbed a woman on July 4 and 5, 1988. 
Subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See R. 68 
(remittitur). 
2With leave of court, R. 71, an amended petition was filed 
March 31, 1992. R. 72-113. 
3Mr. Dall's criminal file in Third District Court, No. 
881991695, before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, was separately 
paginated and is referred to here as "Crim.". This file was not 
reviewed by the PSRB or the district court in this matter, but it 
provides useful background information on Mr. Dall, his mental 
health status, and the factual predicate to this case. Parts of 
this file were entered as Exhibits at the evidentiary hearing 
before Judge Lewis, and were reviewed by her. 
5 
Crim. 6-8. On December 12, 1988, Mr.Dall was bound over for trial 
on all counts. Crim. 2-3. 
ARRAIGNMENT 
On January 9, 1989, Mr. Dall was arraigned in Third 
District Court before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. Mr. Dall 
entered his plea of not guilty to all counts. Crim. 23. 
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION 
On December 28, 1988, Mr. Dall filed a notice of intent 
to rely on a defense of diminished mental capacity. Crim. 29. On 
January 17, 1989, Judge Hanson ordered that Mr. Dall be evaluated. 
Crim. 31. Evaluations were performed by Dr. John Malouf and Dr. 
Breck LeBegue. Evaluations from both examiners were considered by 
Judge Hanson at the time of Mr. Dall's sentencing, and are 
contained in the file in a manila envelope. 
(a) Dr. Malouf evaluated Kirk Dall on February 3, 1989. 
Dr. Malouf also relied on psychological testing, interviews with 
Mr. Dall's family members, jail mental health workers, and review 
of Mr. Dall's jail mental health records. 
Dr. Malouf reported Mr. Dall's Intelligence Quotient to 
be in the dull normal range and that his intellectual functioning 
was limited by certain cognitive processes. He also noticed 
evidence of a disorder in "the schizophrenic spectrum likely with 
organic involvement." Mr. Dall's performance on testing suggested 
"organic impairments of significant level." The disorder was one 
that had been with Mr. Dall since early childhood. Report at 3. 
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Dr. Malouf described Mr. Dall as a person who is socially 
isolated, resistant to change, and who has an idiosyncratic, very 
personalized view of the world. He reported that a Dr. Mike 
Stevens had diagnosed Mr. Dall as being either autistic or 
suffering from a pervasive developmental disorder. Dr. Malouf7s 
impressions of Mr. Dall were consistent with those diagnoses. Dr. 
Malouf stated that "Mr. Dall displays manifestations of a disorder 
which first appeared in childhood or possibly at birth." Id. at 4. 
Dr. Malouf expressed concern over the possibility of 
victimization and concluded by stating, in part, "Mr. Dall is a man 
with considerable deficiencies in personal and interpersonal 
functioning . . . . His idiosyncratic and very personalized way of 
viewing the world and his potential for being victimized suggest 
that he be involved in some type of therapeutic program." 
(b) Dr. Breck LeBegue, M.D. submitted two reports to 
Judge Hanson. The first of these reports is dated March 9, 1989 
and is based on Dr. LeBegue's evaluations of Mr. Dall on February 
20 and March 3 of 1989, interviews with various family members and 
mental health workers, and reviews of mental health records. 
Dr. LeBegue opined that Mr. Dall "experiences substantial 
impairment from a serious mental illness," Report at 2, and 
diagnosed Mr. Dall as having Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
(present since childhood) and Schizotypal Personality Disorder. 
Dr. LeBegue noted that jail mental health workers and unit 
psychiatrists had diagnosed a psychosis and had treated Mr. Dall 
with anti-psychotic medications. 
7 
The "Diagnostic Discussion" portion of the report states: 
The defendant has a clear history of a broad 
developmental failure in many areas, dating from 
childhood. He was odd, had significant learning 
disabilities in school, profound disturbance in ability 
to relate to others, and intermittent bizarre behavior 
for many years. This massive disturbance in many areas 
of mental function is probably best diagnosed as 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder. This diagnostic 
category is not well described in the present diagnostic 
manual; but is akin to, but less severe, than childhood 
autism. Further, it is similar to, and perhaps a 
predecessor of, adult schizophrenia; in fact, it was 
previously called childhood schizophrenia. 
Id. at 5. 
Dr. LeBegue continued, "The features of psychotic 
thinking and extreme social withdrawal seen in pervasive 
developmental disorder do not usually respond to anti-psychotic 
medications, in contrast to adult onset schizophrenia. This 
pattern is consistent with Mr. Dall's lack of response to treatment 
over the last eight months in jail. He is unlikely to improve to 
any significant degree." Id. 
Dr. LeBegue concluded his March 9, 1989, report by 
stating that Mr. Dall qualified for a finding of guilty and 
mentally ill. He recommended additional testing to determine Mr. 
Dall's ability to function in a structured halfway house. He 
closed by stating that Mr. Dall would "be at a significant risk to 
be harmed or to harm himself if incarcerated at prison." Id. at 7. 
Dr. LeBegue's second report, dated July 18, 1989, was 
prepared at the request of Judge' Hanson as a means of providing an 
update of Mr. Dall's condition. Dr. LeBegue concluded at that time 
that Mr. Dall did not qualify for a finding of guilty and mentally 
8 
ill because he did not "pose an immediate danger." Report at 1. 
Dr. LeBegue continued in his diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder and noted that Mr. Dall had responded to anti-psychotic 
medication. Dr. LeBegue also noted that the psychotic features of 
the disorder returned once the anti-psychotic medication was 
discontinued. Dr. LeBegue stated that "[f]rom a medical 
perspective, his illness may be safely managed in a corrections 
halfway house under constant observation and long term psychiatric 
treatment with anti-psychotic medication and intensive 
psychotherapy to help correct his considerably deviant sexual 
fantasies." Id. at 3. Dr. LeBegue warned, however, that " [i]f he 
discontinues his medication he does pose a danger to himself and 
others in the foreseeable future (2-4 months), regardless of where 
he is housed. Even on medication, he is at risk of victimization 
if imprisoned, due to his continuing oddities of behavior and poor 
social skills and judgement." Id. (emphasis added). 
PLEA BARGAIN 
On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty and 
mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree 
felony, and one count of Kidnapping, a second degree felony. Crim. 
42-48. A diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Hospital was 
ordered. Crim. 49. 
SENTENCING HEARING 
On July 28, 1989, a sentencing hearing was conducted 
before the Honorable Timothy Hanson. Crim. 61. Prior to the 
hearing Judge Hanson reviewed the reports submitted by Dr. Malouf 
9 
and Dr. LeBegue. See transcript of Proceedings of July 28, 1989 
(Exhibit 2, hereafter "Sent.") at 3-4. Dr. Breck LeBegue and 
Monica Ebert testified at the hearing. Agent Kathy Shepherd of 
Adult Probation and Parole likewise testified. 
(a) TESTIMONY OF DR. BRECK LeBEGUE 
Dr. LeBegue was called on behalf of Mr. Dall. The State 
stipulated to Dr. LeBegue's qualifications. Sent, at 6. Dr. 
LeBegue testified that he reviewed several sources of information 
including psychological assessments, statements of mental health 
professionals, statements of family members, reports of jail mental 
health professionals, and police records. 
Dr. LeBegue testified that Kirk Dall was suffering from 
a mental disease or defect as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
and diagnosed Mr. Dall as having a Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder, a "major impairment of thinking and mood and behavior." 
Sent, at 8. He also diagnosed Mr. Dall as having a withdrawn 
personality. Dr. LeBegue described Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder as follows: 
It is first a severe mental illness. It's manifested 
usually in childhood, usually before school age, and the 
symptoms are impairment in mental function in many, many 
areas. There's usually impairment in the development and 
use of language. There is impairment in social 
development such that people do not develop the usual, 
easy, normal, social relationships with other people, 
either with other boys or girls. They have odd 
mannerisms, odd behavior that may at times seem 
irrational, and totally unrelated to fads, or to choice. 
They have odd thinking styles. They have unusual moods, 
or changes of mood, from one mood to another. And this 
persists throughout life. That is, it usually starts 
young, persists into the teen years, and on into adult 
years. 
10 
Sent, at 9-10. 
Dr. LeBegue testified that the diagnosis was reached 
through examinations and evaluation of Mr. Dall's behavior and 
mannerisms throughout his life time. Mr. Dall was not a person who 
suddenly became psychotic, but was rather a person who had 
exhibited "a whole history of deficits in a variety of areas for a 
long period of time." Sent, at 11. Mr. Dall also exhibited 
behaviors characteristic of brain damage which, by his estimate, 
had been present a long time. Sent, at 12. 
Dr. LeBegue also observed characteristics in Mr. Dall 
consistent with the existence of Savantism, which he described as 
"an unusual pattern of surprising mental ability in contrast to the 
rest of the academic or intellectual achievement." Sent, at 13. 
Savantism is an organic disorder of brain structure and function. 
Mr. Dall came to the attention of jail mental health 
workers within four days of being booked into jail. Dr. LeBegue 
reported a disturbance of mood and indicated that Mr. Dall behaved 
in ways so irritating to inmates around him that he provoked a 
"potential assault upon himself." Sent, at 18. Dr. LeBegue 
described Mr. Dall as "confused" and clearly delusional. Dr. 
LeBegue reported that Mr. Dall banged on his cell, thought he was 
at the cafe where he had worked, assaulted and threatened jail 
personnel, and tried to dig out of his cell. Sent, at 19. Mr. 
Dall improved "to some extent" with anti-psychotic medication, but 
his thinking "did not normalize, did not return to clear, rational, 
sequential, logical thinking." Sent, at 20. Dr. LeBegue stated 
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that Kirk Dall "clearly decompensated" in the jail and stated that 
"off medication in another correctional setting, the behavior in 
the jail . . . can accurately predict behavior in prison if he's 
off medication or on inadequate doses or in a heavy stress 
situation." Sent, at 21. 
Dr. LeBegue reiterated his concern about the potential 
for victimization in a correctional setting. Dr. LeBegue testified 
that it was likely that Mr. Dall would be victimized in prison: 
He provokes others without knowing it. He does odd, or 
unusual, provocative things that make other people angry. 
He doesn't intend to do so and in a correctional setting, 
he'll be at risk to be assaulted. It's already been 
documented that he was. They had to move him to keep him 
from being assaulted previously in jail. 
Sent, at 21. Dr. LeBegue opined that even with treatment 
consisting of anti-psychotic medication and psychotherapy, Mr. Dall 
would be at risk for victimization. 
Q [by Mr. Bradshaw] Also fair to say without 
treatment he has the potential for being victimized in 
the prison setting? 
A [Dr. LeBegue] Well, yes, without treatment, and 
perhaps even with treatment, because the medication will 
not change his basic style, ineptness, his reading of 
special cues. He does not use language well. He doesn't 
interpret the language and meaning of others well. And 
I think even with treatment, anti-psychotic medication, 
in general population in prison he'd be victimized. 
Sent, at 25-6. 
Dr. LeBegue stated that Mr. Dall could be managed in a 
prison setting designed for those people with chronic mental 
illness. Such a facility would necessarily provide 24 hour 
observation to monitor the presence of symptoms, the response to 
treatment, and side effects. Sent, at 26. In addition, the 
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"observation" would have to be of a supportive nature rather than 
threatening, frightening, or posing risk of victimization. The 
facility must also assure that Mr. Dall continues to take adequate 
doses of anti-psychotic medication and mood stabilizing medication. 
Sent, at 27. 
If, however, the prison setting failed to provide a 
nurturing environment or provided an environment that was as 
confrontational as the rest of the prison, Dall would likely be 
able to decompensate perhaps even on medication." The same would 
be true in Dr. LeBegue's opinion if Mr. Dall were housed in an area 
that did not provide 24 hour monitoring or therapy. Dr. LeBegue 
stated that the potential for decompensation was "greater at the 
prison if in general population, not in a supportive environment," 
than at the State Hospital. Sent, at 34. 
(b) TESTIMONY OF MONICA EBERT 
Monica Ebert, a Ph.D. intern at the Utah State Hospital, 
also testified. Ms. Ebert testified that she had evaluated Mr. 
Dall by way of a clinical interview and administration of a battery 
of psychological tests. Based on her observations and testing, Ms. 
Ebert believed that Mr. Dall had the "potential" to be a danger 
because of his "tendency to act impulsively, and act on . . . 
beliefs he has that might be persecutory in nature." Sent, at 36-
7. Ms. Ebert diagnosed Mr. Dall as having a "delusional disorder" 
which includes "paranoid features." Sent, at 38. Ms. Ebert 
further testified that "[t]here's a possibility of decompensation 
if placed in [prison]" as well as a possibility of victimization. 
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Id. This was due, in her opinion, to "the nature of his 
personality, it's possible that he may invoke irritation in others. 
It's possible that he may not be aware of that, because sometimes 
he has trouble understanding the impact he has on others.ff Sent. 
at 39. 
Following the testimony of Dr. LeBegue and Monica Ebert, 
Judge Hanson began to discuss the placement options available to 
him. In weighing the various options Judge Hanson stated: 
And I am pretty much convinced of one thing [,] that Mr. 
Dall is not an appropriate candidate for general 
population in the Utah State Prison for obvious reasons. 
Not the least of which he wouldn't survive in that 
setting. 
Sent, at 43. 
(c) TESTIMONY OF AP&P AGENT KATHY SHEPHERD 
Judge Hanson thereafter heard from Agent Kathy Shepherd 
of Adult Probation and Parole. Ms. Shepherd was asked to comment 
on programs available at the State Prison. Ms. Shepherd noted that 
while the prison could maintain Mr. Dall on medication, sex 
offender treatment for Mr. Dall was virtually non-existent in the 
prison setting. Ms. Shepherd discussed the "revamp" program at the 
prison as being "very similar to that offered by Bonneville." 
Sent, at 48. Ms. Shepherd noted, however, that "[t]he person has 
to be reasonably well functioning to participate successfully in 
that. And I don't believe given the problems in this situation I 
would consider him as an appropriate candidate in any fashion for 
that" Id^ 
(d) STATEMENT OF KIRK W. DALL 
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Following argument from Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Vuyk, the 
trial court granted Mr. Dall the benefit of the record to make a 
statement. Sent. 54-61. This statement is quite illuminating with 
respect to Mr. Dall's mental health, and petitioner would refer the 
court to that portion of the transcript. 
SENTENCE 
Based on the testimony presented at the sentencing 
hearing, Judge Hanson ordered that Kirk W. Dall be sentenced to 
concurrent terms of incarceration of 1 to 15 years for the crime of 
Forcible Sexual Abuse and 1 to 15 years for the crime of 
Kidnapping. Crim. 61; Sent, at 64. Judge Hanson ordered that Mr. 
Dall be sent to the Utah State Hospital for treatment. Judge 
Hanson based his order on findings that Mr. Dall was mentally ill, 
and that the State Hospital was the only appropriate facility in 
existence to care for Mr. Dall's unique needs. Sent. 63-70. Judge 
Hanson specifically found that "there is no other place besides the 
Utah State Hospital," Sent, at 66 and "that commitment to the State 
Hospital is the only appropriate facility." Sent, at 67. 
Judge Hanson also made the following findings with respect to 
victimization at the State Prison: 
It may be that there will be a new program that will be 
available by then. But until that time, I'm satisfied 
that Mr. Dall needs assistance, and the only place that 
can be properly rendered at the present time is the Utah 
State Hospital. 
I'm absolutely convinced that if I sent him to 
the Utah State Prison that he'd last--if he lasted three 
weeks, I'd be surprised. He's susceptible to influence. 
The evidence is clear that he does things to annoy 
people, and that he doesn't understand it, and knowing 
the general population at the Utah State Prison, he'd be 
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subjected to all kinds of things that would be 
[in]appropriate, many of them life threatening. 
And while Mr. Dall has broken the law, I do not 
believe that our society has reached the point that we 
don't care about people that have problems like his. We 
do. I'm not going to throw him into that den of 
in[iquity] out there. And so--I think we all agree on 
that. 
Sent, at 68. In addition, in his order of August 10, 1989, Judge 
Hanson found "that because of the defendant's mental condition, 
there is a serious risk that he will be harmed or killed if he is 
put in the Utah State Prison." See Exhibit 8 (Order dated August 
10, 1989; Crim. 65-66; attached as Addendum A ) . 
REVIEW OF SENTENCE 
Judge Hanson scheduled review dates to monitor Mr. Dall's 
progress and treatment and to determine "whether there is some less 
restrictive facility or less expensive facility that provides the 
same treatment for Mr. Dall." Sent, at 67. On January 22, 1990, 
Judge Hanson conducted a review of Mr. Dall's sentence. As a 
result of statutory changes, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 et seq. , 
jurisdiction of Mr. Dall's case had vested with the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board ("PSRB"). Judge Hanson was so advised, and 
took no further action. Crim. 69. 
FIRST PSRB HEARING 
On April 17, 1991,4 a hearing was conducted before the 
PSRB to determine whether it was appropriate to transfer Mr. Dall 
4
 It is not clear from the record whether the first hearing 
before the PSRB was held on April 17, 1991. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated April 24, 1991, list the date as April 19, 
1991. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 2, 1991, 
list the date as April 17, 1991. 
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from the jurisdiction of the PSRB and the Utah State Hospital to 
the Utah Board of Pardons and potentially, the Utah State Prison. 
The standard of transfer applied by the PSRB was that of "maximum 
benefit of treatment." 
Prior to the April 1991 hearing, James C. Bradshaw, 
attorney for Mr. Dall, requested that the PSRB delineate the 
guidelines used to determine transfer. Mr. Bradshaw also requested 
permission to appear before the PSRB on Mr. Dall's behalf. See 
Exhibit 6 (letter from James Bradshaw dated January 17, 1991, 
attached as Addendum D). 
On February 25, 1991, Mr. Bradshaw sent a second letter 
to the PSRB, requesting the appointment of experts to testify on 
Mr. Dall's behalf. Mr. Dall was, at that point, indigent. Mr. 
Bradshaw expressed concern as to the independence of State Hospital 
experts and requested that the State pay all costs "associated with 
the retention of independent experts." See Exhibit 7 (letter dated 
February 25, 1991; attached as Addendum E) . Mr. Bradshaw's request 
for appointment of independent experts was denied. 
Mr. Dall was represented by James C. Bradshaw at the 
hearing. The State was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Jeff Hunt. Dr. Philip Washburn testified on behalf of the Utah 
State Hospital. Following testimony from Dr. Washburn and 
argument, the PSRB found that Mr. Dall had received the "maximum 
benefit from treatment" from treatment and programs at the Utah 
State Hospital and ordered that Mr. Dall "be discharged from the 
Utah State Hospital and that he be remanded to the custody and 
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jurisdiction of the Utah State Board of Pardons." See Exhibit 9 
(April 24, 1991 Order of the PSRB, attached as Addendum B). The 
PSRB's sole recommendation to the Board of Pardons regarding Mr. 
Dall was that his "psychotropic medication be continued." Id. 
SECOND PSRB HEARING 
The recording equipment used to preserve the record of 
the April 1991 proceedings malfunctioned and the record was 
destroyed. A second hearing before the PSRB was scheduled for June 
28, 1991. As of that time, the PSRB had already concluded that Mr. 
Dall had received the "maximum benefit from treatment" as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5. 
On June 28, 1991, Mr. Dall was represented by Mr. 
Bradshaw, and the State was again represented by Assistant Attorney 
General Jeffrey Hunt. Dr. Washburn was called by Mr. Bradshaw and 
once again testified on behalf of the State Hospital. Mr. Dall was 
denied the appointment of experts and compulsory process. Evidence 
and testimony were presented to determine whether Mr. Dall had 
received the "maximum benefit of treatment" even though there had 
been a prior finding of maximum benefit in April of 1991. 
(a) TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILIP WASHBURN 
As of the time of the June 28, 1991, hearing before the 
PSRB, Dr. Washburn was the clinical director at the Utah State 
Hospital. Dr. Washburn participated in evaluations of Mr. Dall. 
Dr. Washburn and Dr. Delyse participated jointly in the treatment 
of Mr. Dall. See Transcript of June 28, 1991 Hearing before PSRB, 
(Exhibit 1, hereafter PSRB) at 7. During the course of Mr. Dall's 
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treatment and prior to the June 28 hearing, Dr. Washburn reviewed 
reports prepared by Dr. LeBegue and Dr. Gregory. 
(1) Diagnosis 
Dr. Washburn diagnosed Mr. Dall as having what he termed 
to be a "schizo-affective disorder with depressive features." He 
also diagnosed paraphilia. PSRB at 8. Dr. Washburn noted that Mr. 
Dall's personality difficulties extended back into childhood and, 
and there had been a variety of personality diagnoses. He felt it 
necessary to "emphasize the complex, difficult, long-term nature of 
his mental disorder." Id. Mr. Dall's mental health problems 
consisted of a "major mental disorder of a . . . more recent adult 
onset" and "ongoing personality problems" that extended into Mr. 
Dall's childhood. PSRB at 9. 
Dr. Washburn testified that his diagnosis and Dr. 
LeBegue's diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder were 
somewhat related. Pervasive Developmental Disorder is also known 
as "Childhood Schizophrenia." Dr. Washburn concluded that Mr. Dall 
suffers from "some type of schizophrenia spectrum disease or a 
range of diseases that would fit into the category of 
schizophrenia." PSRB at 9. 
(2) Symptoms Exhibited 
Mr. Dall was treated for a schizo-affective disorder and 
a schizoid personality. In addition to his difficulty relating to 
and understanding others, Mr. Dall was isolated emotionally and 
socially and demonstrated an "affective disturbance in terms of 
some depression." PSRB at 10. Dall's mood and affect have been 
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"blunted." There was also a serious suicide attempt where Mr. Dall 
placed a plastic bag over his face. Id. Mr. Dall also 
demonstrated "a kind of fantasy, delusional kind of thinking which 
reflected a thought disorder" which Dr. Washburn found to be "quite 
disturbing." PSRB at 11. Mr. Dall's delusional thinking included 
thoughts that through continued imprisonment, Mr. Dall's victim 
would come to love him and develop normal relations with him and 
thought that Mr. Dall could treat himself. 
(3) Treatment 
Mr. Dall had been exposed to a number of treatment 
regimens that included various medications and therapy. Dr. 
Washburn characterized Mr. Dall's response to the treatment as 
"limited, not as good as we would like." PSRB at 12. Dr. Washburn 
explained that the reason Mr. Dall's response was limited was 
because of the "long-term nature of his problem." Mr. Dall's 
problems were more ingrained because of their long-term nature. As 
a result, the remission of Mr. Dall's symptoms and problems had not 
been good. PSRB at 26. 
Mr. Dall had been prescribed a variety of medications 
which included neuroleptic (anti-psychotic) medication and anti-
depressants. Dall was started on Haldol in October of 1989 and was 
switched to Navine in November of 1989. Both are anti-psychotic 
medications. During the time he was on Navine, examiners noticed 
depression and prescribed Prozac. Mellaril was tried for a period 
of time, but was "rather sedating." PSRB at 11. Mellaril was 
discontinued on May 10 of 1991 and Mr. Dall was placed on Serentil. 
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PSRB at 16. According to Dr. Washburn, the Serentil was more 
effective in treating Mr. Dall than previous medications. The 
Serentil was less sedating and is better for people who have an 
"underlying organic brain impairment." Id. Dr. Washburn felt that 
the Serentil "works best for him." PSRB at 17. 
Dr. Washburn testified that finding the correct 
medication for any given person takes time and must be determined 
individually. PSRB at 15. It is sometimes necessary to try a 
number of different medications, particularly "with a person who 
has this long term, more deeply ingrained kind of difficulty that 
does extend back into childhood and adolescent years." PSRB at 15. 
Ironically, it was not until May 10, 1991, some 2 1/2 weeks after 
Mr. Dall's first hearing before the PSRB that Dr. Washburn 
discovered that Serentil was a better medication for Mr. Dall. 
This improvement in Mr. Dall's treatment occurred after the PSRB 
had found that he had received "maximum benefit of treatment." In 
fact, Dr. Washburn testified that Dall improved between May of 
1991, and June 28, 1991. PSRB at 37. 
People such as Mr. Dall who are prescribed anti-psychotic 
and anti-depressant medication need to be monitored. Serious side 
effects can develop. PSRB at 18. The medications must be checked 
regularly, no longer than every two to three months. PSRB at 19. 
Where there is additional stress, such as the stress presented by 
a prison setting, medication must be reviewed and perhaps 
increased. PSRB at 19. 
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Dr. Washburn acknowledged that Mr. Dall lacked insight 
into his mental illness. He indicated that a lack of insight is 
quite common for people who have mental disorders, particularly 
with those who have a schizophrenic spectrum disease. PSRB at 35. 
Mr. Dall's ideas that he can cure himself are also symptoms or 
products of his mental illness. PSRB at 36. 
(4) Prognosis 
Dr. Washburn testified that the treatment of individuals 
with life-long psychiatric thinking disorders is focused on the 
reversal of symptoms and preventing decompensation, rather than on 
"curing" or "fixing" the individual. PSRB at 23, 24, 34-35. To 
accomplish this treatment goal it is necessary to administer a 
regimen of properly monitored medication and continuing counseling 
and therapy. PSRB at 24-25. Dr. Washburn indicated that if 
medication were either improperly monitored or discontinued or if 
therapy were discontinued, Mr. Dall would decompensate. PSRB at 
27, 28. With schizophrenic patients, the recurrence of major 
symptoms can be as high as 60% in one year if they are away from 
medication. PSRB at 24. 
Dr. Washburn stated that there is "a chance or 
likelihood" that Mr. Dall would decompensate if sent to prison. 
PSRB at 29. He testified that the State Hospital has had a number 
of mentally ill patients go to the prison and decompensate. PSRB 
at 30. Dr. Washburn has seen patients become "really psychotic" in 
the prison setting even though they may have been only slightly ill 
before prison incarceration. PSRB at 61-62. Dr. Washburn listed 
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several reasons. Initially, the individual environment changes, as 
do stress levels. PSRB at 29. In addition, a prison is not a 
hospital and does not have the resources of a hospital. PSRB at 
29-30. The monitoring of medication is more difficult and the 
standards of monitoring medication are lower than at a hospital. 
PSRB at 30-32. Resources for therapy and counseling are severely 
limited. In addition, inmates at the prison are permitted to 
refuse medication, whereas patients at the hospital are required to 
take medication. PSRB at 30. Dr. Washburn testified that very few 
individuals in Mr. Dall's situation benefit from transfer from a 
hospital setting (with support, residential programs, follow-up 
programs and treatment programs), to the Utah State Prison. PSRB 
at 48. 
Dr. Washburn concluded that prison treatment of mentally 
ill offenders is unacceptable. Prison is a stress-filled 
environment that can adversely effect mentally ill offenders. PSRB 
at 19, 29, 39, 31, 54, 56. Prison is more difficult for mentally 
ill offenders to cope with. PSRB at 61. Dr. Washburn stated that 
presently prison treatment of mentally ill offenders suffers from 
many problems. PSRB at 62. Because of the lack of resources and 
lack of understanding, prison permits non-treatment to occur. PSRB 
at 62. Dr. Washburn also agreed with Dr. LeBegue that there was a 
substantial risk that Mr. Dall would be harmed in prison or would 
harm himself. 
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(5) Maximum Benefit from Treatment 
Dr. Washburn testified that while Mr. Dall had benefited 
from his stay at the hospital, he had not received the maximum 
benefit from treatment available at the hospital. In fact, Dr. 
Washburn testified that "he can still benefit from being at the 
Hospital. But we have to weigh the costs and benefits." PSRB at 
51. 
Dr. Washburn testified that to receive maximum benefit 
from treatment, the treatment must be ongoing. Mr. Dall needs 
treatment for the rest of his life. Maximum treatment for people 
such as Mr. Dall has to be ongoing treatment. PSRB at 39, 40. If 
economics and resources were not a consideration and if Mr. Dall 
were in a secure facility, Dr. Washburn would conclude that Mr. 
Dall had not received maximum benefit from treatment. PSRB at 39. 
Dr. Washburn did not say that Mr. Dall had received maximum 
benefit. PSRB at 44. Instead, Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau" 
where the need for bedspace outweighed the perceived potential 
benefit of continued treatment at the hospital. PSRB at 41. Dr. 
Washburn stated that as a professional, he strives not to make 
decisions based on economics alone. PSRB at 50. 
Dr. Washburn testified that in his opinion guilty and 
mentally ill individuals need a system different from the prison. 
That system would have a hospital for the acute cases and then 
residential treatment programs where they could be transferred when 
acute treatment is not needed. PSRB at 41. "The prison system, to 
my way of thinking, would not be the best system." Id. 
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Dr. Washburn expressed concern over the maximum benefit 
of treatment standard. His initial concern was that the standard 
carried with it the connotation or implication of "Okay, now we're 
cured, " when in fact "curing" is not the goal of psychiatric 
treatment for individuals such as Mr. Dall. PSRB at 23, 24, 34. 
Dr. Washburn stated that the maximum benefit from treatment model 
does not fit his way of thinking regarding the treatment of 
mentally ill psychiatric patients. PSRB at 42, 43. The standard 
does not take into account that an individual's treatment needs may 
change over time or that an individual such as Mr. Dall may require 
future hospitalizations. PSRB at 43. In addition, caseloads at the 
prison are so high that they exceed what Dr. Washburn would 
consider an acceptable manageable professional standard. PSRB at 
54. Dr. Washburn expressed concern over the size of the prison 
caseload and the ability of the prison staff to provide treatment. 
Id. 
Following the hearing the PSRB ruled again that Mr. Dall 
had received the "maximum benefit from treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital." PSRB at 65. The PSRB entered an ordered dated July 2, 
1991, directing that "Kirk Wesley Dall be discharged from the Utah 
State Hospital and that he be remanded to the custody and 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Board of Pardons." The order 
directed that Kirk Dall remain in the custody of the State Hospital 
"until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and 
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons." See Exhibit 10 (July 
2, 1991 Order of the PSRB; attached as Addendum C) . The order made 
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no recommendations to the Utah Board of Pardons regarding treatment 
or placement of Mr. Dall. Id. 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
An evidentiary hearing in petitioner's case was held 
before the trial court on June 14, 1993. Testimony was taken from 
Dr. Philip Washburn, Dr. Robert J. Howell, and Mr. Robert Verville. 
See transcript, R. 603-721. The following exhibits were 
introduced: 
1 - Transcript of PSRB hearing of June 28, 1991, with 
exhibits (referred to herein as "PSRB"). 
2 - Sentencing hearing transcript (July 28, 1989) 
(referred to herein as "Sent."). 
3 - Settlement Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand, case No. 
89-C-1124J in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah. 
4 - [Not received into evidence] 
5 - Transcript of January 22, 1990 review hearing 
conducted by Judge Hanson. 
6 - Letter dated January 17, 1991 from Mr. Bradshaw to 
PSRB. 
7 - Letter dated February 25, 1991 from Mr. Bradshaw to 
PSRB. 
8 - Sentencing order in State v. Dall, case no. 
881991695, dated August 10, 1989. 
9 - PSRB order dated April 24, 1991. 
10 - PSRB order dated July 2, 1991. 
11 - Application and order for stay in this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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The "maximum benefit" standard was enacted after Mr. 
Dall's offense and sentencing. Application of that standard to Mr. 
Dall increases the severity of his punishment, and is thus an 
illegal application of an ex post facto law. The "maximum benefit" 
standard is also arbitrary and capricious. 
The evidence at the PSRB hearing did not support the 
PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from 
treatment. To the contrary, the evidence showed that Mr. Dall 
would continue to need treatment for the rest of his life. 
Transfer of Mr. Dall to the prison would constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment, and unnecessary rigor. The prison is not 
adequately equipped to deal with persons such as Mr. Dall. 
The PSRB'S action is an unlawful exercise of judicial 
power by the executive branch of government in violation of Article 
V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. The failure to provide 
judicial review of PSRB actions renders the delegation of power to 
the PSRB unconstitutional. Additionally, Mr. Dall's 
constitutional right to appeal has been infringed. 
Finally, Mr. Dall was denied compulsory process and 
financial access to expert testimony to present his case. 
The order of the trial court denying the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus should be reversed. The order of the PSRB 
should be reversed and vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PSRB'S APPLICATION OF THE 
MAXIMUM BENEFIT STANDARD TO MR. DALL IS 
AN ILLEGAL APPLICATION OF AN EX POST 
FACTO LAW. 
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The PSRB applied the "maximum benefit from treatment" 
standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 to Mr. Dall in making its 
determination that he should be transferred to the jurisdiction and 
custody of the Board of Pardons. This standard was not adopted 
until March 13, 1990.5 The PSRB's attempted application of this 
new substantive standard to Mr. Dall is an illegal application of 
an ex post facto law in violation of Article I, section 18 of the 
Utah Constitution, and Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the 
United States Constitution. 
It has been generally held and is well settled 
that: 
any statute which punishes as a crime an act 
previously committed, which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime, after its commission, 
or which deprives one charged with crime of 
any defense available according to law at the 
time when the act was committed, is prohibited 
as ex post facto. 
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 
(1925)). 
"[0]ne is not barred from challenging a change in the 
penal code on ex post facto grounds simply because the sentence he 
received under the new law was not more onerous than that which he 
might have received under the old." Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 
282, 300, 97 S.Ct. 2290, , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 360 (1977); accord 
5Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 was repealed effective July 1, 
1992. The "maximum benefit" standard is currently codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(3)(a) (Supp. 1993). 
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Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432, 107 S. Ct. 2446, , 96 
L.Ed.2d 351, 361 (1987). 
The correct inquiry here is whether there was fair notice 
and governmental restraint shown with respect to Mr. Dall, not 
whether he had a vested right to be incarcerated at the hospital 
rather than the prison: 
The presence or absence of an affirmative right is not 
relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition, 
which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe 
than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be 
punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post 
Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less 
punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental 
restraint when the legislature increases punishment 
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was 
consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal 
provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it 
violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more 
onerous than the law in effect on the date of the 
offense. 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30-1, 101 S.Ct. 960, , 67 L.Ed.2d 
17, 24 (1981) (finding statute reducing "gain time credits" 
available to inmates for good behavior while incarcerated to be ex 
post facto as applied to a prisoner whose crime was committed 
before effective date). Although Mr. Dall concedes he has no 
vested right to incarceration at the hospital, he is entitled to 
fair notice and governmental restraint when the State changes the 
substantive legal standard under which such transfers are 
evaluated. 
This case must be distinguished from State v. Burgess, 
870 P. 2d 276 (Utah App. 1994) . Burgess concerned whether 
application of the review procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 
was ex post facto as to Burgess when § 77-16a-l et seq. were in 
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force at the time of his offense. No change in standard occurred; 
maximum benefit is utilized under both these transfer procedures. 
In fact, Burgess conceded that he is better off under the new 
statute. Id. at 280 n.6. In the instant case, the change was 
substantive and worked to Mr. Dall's detriment. Burgess sheds no 
light on the inquiry here. 
At the time of Mr. Dall's offense, plea, and sentencing, 
the codified standard in effect for transfer of mentally ill 
offenders from the hospital to the prison is found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16-5: 
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person -- Certification 
to Board of Pardons. 
(1) A person committed to the state hospital after 
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental 
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of 
Pardons by the clinical director. 
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person 
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall 
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for 
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with 
credit for time served while confined at the hospital. 
The certification of the clinical director of the 
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical 
facts justifying his certification. 
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding 
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state 
hospital. 
(Emphasis added). This standard contemplates recovery, rather than 
maximum benefit, as the standard triggering transfer from the state 
hospital. In some cases, offenders will "sufficiently recover" to 
allow transfer to the prison. In Mr. Dall's case, such recovery is 
an extremely remote possibility. It certainly had not occurred by 
April 1991, by June 28, 1991, or even as of the present date. 
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Under the appropriate standard, Mr. Dall's transfer was 
inappropriate as of the present date and any date in the past. 
Judge Hanson's original order of commitment expressly found that 
Mr. Dall would be victimized if placed in prison, and may be 
subject to physical harm or even death. Nothing has changed as of 
the present time. Transfer to the prison under a different, less 
stringent standard subjected Mr. Dall to "more burdensome 
punishment" for his crime, in violation of his constitutional right 
to be free from ex post facto legislation. 
The maximum benefit standard also irreconcilably 
conflicts with the codified standard for discharge of patients from 
the Utah State Hospital: 
62A-12-229. Release from commitment. 
(3) When the patient has been committed to the 
division under judicial proceedings, the division shall 
use the procedures described in Sections 62A-12-24 0 and 
62A-12-241. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-229 (Supp. 1992). 
62A-12-240. Periodic review and discharge. 
The director or his designee shall, as 
frequently as practicable, examine or cause to be 
examined every person committed to the division. 
Whenever the director or his designee determines that the 
conditions justifying involuntary commitment no longer 
exist, he shall discharge the patient. If the patient 
has been committed through judicial proceedings, a report 
describing that determination shall be sent to the clerk 
of the court where the proceedings were held. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992). 
(1) The director or his designee may release an 
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be 
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to 
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his 
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designee determines that the conditions justifying 
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be 
discharged. If the patient has been committed through 
judicial proceedings, a report describing that 
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court 
where the proceedings were held. 
(2) (a) The director or his designee is 
authorized to issue an order for the immediate 
placement of a patient not previously released 
from an order of commitment into a more 
restrictive environment, if the director or his 
designee has reason to believe that the less 
restrictive environment in which the patient has 
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental 
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234(10) , 
or that the patient has failed to comply with the 
specified treatment plan to which the patient had 
agreed in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992). 
Mr. Dall is still mentally ill. The "conditions 
justifying involuntary commitment" still existed, so discharge was 
not appropriate.6 Mr. Dall had not improved and had not agreed in 
writing to transfer to a less restrictive environment, so no such 
transfer was appropriate. The State has not shown that "the less 
restrictive environment in which the patient has been placed is 
aggravating [Mr. Dall's] mental illness," so transfer to a more 
restrictive environment was not appropriate. Mr. Dall should have 
stayed at the hospital. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the State elicited testimony 
indicating that the State Hospital transferred prisoners from the 
6The Court is referred to the testimony of Dr. Washburn at the 
evidentiary hearing, to the effect that (except for being somewhat 
less depressed) Mr. Dall is much the same person as when originally 
committed. R. 630-36. 
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Utah State Hospital to the prison under a clinical standard7 that 
in fact is similar to the "maximum benefit" standard that was later 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5. Nevertheless, this de facto 
clinical maximum benefit standard conflicts with the well 
established law at that time under Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 and 
Title 62A. The State Hospital's ignorance of the law and 
utilization of its own arbitrary standard in the past in no way 
legitimizes application of ex post facto legislation to Mr. Dall. 
Finally, the "maximum benefit standard is arbitrary and 
capricious. It bears no rational relation to the State's 
legitimate interests of penal facility security and treatment of 
mentally ill offenders. In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court declared subsections (4) (c) and 
(4)(d) to be unconstitutional: 
Because the criteria serve a wholly different 
function in the guilty and mentally ill statute than they 
serve in the involuntary commitment statute, some of the 
criteria now contained in section 77-35-21.5(4) are 
irrelevant to an evaluation of whether a defendant should 
be hospitalized instead of imprisoned. We believe that 
subsections (c) and (d) of section 77-35-21.5(4) are not 
rationally related to the sentencing process as opposed 
to civil commitment. 
Id. at 1271. 
Similarly, the "maximum benefit" standard is not 
rationally related to the sentencing process. A significant 
7Mr. Verville, witness for the State, repeatedly confirmed 
that he was unaware of the applicable legal standard for transfer. 
R. 683, 699. Indeed, the State has adduced no evidence that 
indicates the PSRB was aware of the correct legal standard. 
Actions taken by a quasi-judicial administrative agency without 
reference to the applicable law are per se arbitrary and 
capricious. 
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portion of those sent to the State Hospital require ongoing care. 
Serious mental illnesses are not generally capable of being 
"fixed." A more rational inquiry would focus on the individual 
treatment needs of each patient/inmate, and what facilities within 
the correctional system are adequate to meet the medical needs of 
the person. 
The "maximum benefit" standard is divorced from this 
proper inquiry, and instead may lead to a revolving door policy 
where inmates are shipped back and forth between the prison and the 
hospital for continuing cycles of stabilization at the hospital and 
decompensation at the prison. See PSRB at 3 0 (testimony of Dr. 
Washburn). 
The "maximum benefit" standard is ex post facto with 
respect to Mr. Dall, and is arbitrary and capricious. The order of 
the PSRB, as reached under the "maximum benefit" standard, may not 
stand. 
POINT 11. EVEN IF THE "MAXIMUM BENEFIT" 
STANDARD APPLIES TO MR. DALL, THE 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE PSRB HEARING 
FAILS TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT MR. DALL 
HAS RECEIVED THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT OF 
TREATMENT. 
The evidence adduced at the PSRB hearing fails to support 
the PSRB finding that Mr. Dall has received maximum benefit from 
treatment. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Mr. Dall will 
continue to need treatment for the rest of his life, and continued 
to benefit from treatment at the hospital. The "maximum benefit" 
standard does not make sense as applicable to persons in Mr. Dall's 
34 
situation. Treatment must be ongoing, and the State Hospital is 
best suited to provide that treatment. 
Even viewing all of the evidence presented to the PSRB in 
the light most favorable to its finding of maximum benefit, the 
challenged finding is so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus making it erroneous. See 
Smallwood v. Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 718-9 (Utah App. 1992) . 
The trial court made the following finding with respect 
to the evidence at the PSRB hearing: 
The State called no witnesses at the June 28 hearing. 
Dr, Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel 
for Mr. Dall, and cross-examined by the State. Dr. 
Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had not received maximum 
benefit from treatment, and that Mr. Dall must receive 
some treatment for the rest of his life. Dr. Washburn 
testified that Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau" in his 
treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as the 
Hospital would like, but that Mr. Dall would still 
benefit from further treatment at the Hospital. 
R. 569 (Findings %9) . This finding accurately summarizes the 
testimony presented. Dr. Washburn's testimony is described in 
detail supra at 18-25. The medical reports also reviewed by the 
PSRB do not address "maximum benefit" and whether Mr. Dall has 
received "maximum benefit." 
This evidence fails to support a finding that Mr. Dall 
has received "maximum benefit." When asked directly whether Mr. 
Dall had received "maximum benefit," Dr. Washburn indicated that he 
had not. Instead, Dr. Washburn indicated that Mr. Dall had reached 
a plateau, where he was not progressing as rapidly as desired. The 
testimony indicates that the transfer decision, rather than being 
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based on "maximum benefit," was based on economic considerations 
and the need for more bed space for other mentally ill persons. 
The testimony of Dr. Washburn states directly that Mr. 
Dall has not received "maximum benefit." The testimony concerning 
reaching a plateau, even viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, does not contradict this conclusion. Only one witness 
testified, and his testimony is directly contrary to the finding 
reached by the PSRB. The PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall has received 
maximum benefit is against the clear wight of evidence, and is 
clearly erroneous. 
The order of the PSRB must be reversed. 
POINT III. TRANSFER OF MR. DALL TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS 
CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment 
provision originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 96 S.Ct. 2909, , 49 L.Ed.2d 
859, 872 (1976) . Its purpose in our constitution is to prohibit 
"infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments." Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268, 92 S.Ct. 2726, , 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 367 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution parallels 
the federal constitution but goes one step further: "[p]ersons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary 
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rigor." At least three other state constitutions contain a similar 
unnecessary rigor provision: Wyoming,8 Indiana,9 and Tennessee.10 
The other states with an unnecessary rigor provision 
generally apply it to abuses which occur during pretrial 
incarceration. See Suter v. State, 88 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1949); 
Saunders v. State, 392 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. 1965). 
Of the four states with unnecessary rigor provisions, 
only Utah's provision appears in the same section as the cruel and 
unusual punishment section. The constitution's drafters, by 
including unnecessary rigor and cruel and unusual punishment in the 
same section, presumably intended that these provisions be 
interpreted as part of the cruel and unusual punishment 
proscription, and not as a separate provision regulating jail 
conditions. The unique development of Utah constitutional law 
supports this theory. 
8Article I, section 16 of the Wyoming constitution states that 
"[n]o person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons, 
and inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners 
shall be provided for." The Wyoming Constitution includes a 
separate provision to address cruel and unusual punishments. 
Wyoming Const. art. I, § 14. 
9The Indiana Constitution protects persons arrested and 
confined in jail: "[n]o person arrested, or confined in jail, 
shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Indiana Const, art. I, 
§ 15. Indiana's Article I, section 16 addresses cruel and unusual 
punishments. 
10Tennessee provides that " [n]o person arrested and confined 
in jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Tennessee Const, 
art. I, § 13. Tennessee's Article I, section 14 addresses cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
37 
The inclusion of the unnecessary rigor provision in 
Utah's constitution is probably in some part a result of the early 
Mormon persecutions of the 1830's. See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, 
The Mormon Experience
 t 76-77 (1979) ."• The arrest and murder of 
Joseph and Hyrum Smith by vigilantes in 1844 had a profound effect 
on the remaining church members and initiated the Mormon exodus to 
Utah. Id. 
Persecution of the Mormons continued in Utah. The 
territory made six unsuccessful bids for statehood between 1849 and 
1887. R. Poll and T. Alexander, Utah's History, p. 243. The 
primary obstacle to statehood was the Mormons' practice of 
polygamy. Id. Many of the Mormon leaders who moved from Nauvoo to 
Utah were tried and jailed for violations of the Morrill Act of 
186212 and Edmunds Act of 1882.13 The conditions of incarceration 
were described as wretched. Wallentine, supra at 17. It was not 
uncommon for judges to jail women with small children and place 
several prisoners in one cell. Id. 
l:LJoseph Smith was a self-taught constitutional scholar and 
spent countless hours teaching constitutional principles to church 
subordinates. His students later became ecclesiastical and 
political leaders that undoubtedly made significant contributions 
in drafting Utah's numerous constitutions. See Wallentine, Heeding 
the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 13 & 
n.57 (1991). 
12The Morrill Act prohibited plural marriages, disincorporated 
the Mormon church, and restricted church ownership of property to 
$50,000. Utah's History, p. 244. 
13The Edmunds Act declared polygamy a felony and defined 
polygamous living or unlawful cohabitation as a misdemeanor. 
Utah's History, 259. 
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When Utah finally achieved statehood in the late 1890's, 
the drafters of the Utah constitution considered deleting the 
unnecessary rigor language in Article I, section 9. Those who 
criticized the provision pointed out that no other state had that 
language in its constitution. See Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Adopt a Constitution 
for the State of Utah, pp. 267-8 (1898). After returning from 
committee, the provision was retained. Its inclusion is a strong 
indication that the drafters felt a need for protections greater 
than those found in the federal constitution. Indeed, the history 
of Mormon persecution from the 1830's until 1896 provides ample 
evidence that the constitutional drafters were well aware of 
improper treatment of accused and incarcerated persons, and were 
committed to insuring that it did not continue to occur in Utah. 
A review of Utah's history reveals a longstanding 
recognition of the need for humane treatment of mentally ill 
persons and mentally ill offenders. Prior to achieving statehood, 
the early settlers established laws and facilities to ensure 
appropriate treatment for the mentally ill. Salt Lake City was the 
site of the first hospital for the mentally ill in the western 
United States. McKell, History of the Utah State Hospital. Univ. 
of Utah Library Archives (unpublished masters thesis) . Twenty-four 
years prior to passage of the state constitution, territorial 
governor George C. Woods spoke of the need for government to 
address the problems of the mentally ill: 
We now number about one hundred thousand souls with a 
steady and rapid increase from every quarter. We ought 
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to have an asylum for the insane. Humanity requires it. 
There is no public institution where these poor 
unfortunates can be kept. I should fail to do my duty 
were I to omit to urge you to take such steps immediately 
as will meet this great public want. 
Message of Governors 1850-1876, pp 159-60 (Bound volume, Utah 
Historical Society). 
The laws of the territory provided for humane treatment 
of mentally ill offenders: 
Every person guilty of any unnecessarily harsh, cruel, or 
unkind treatment of, or any neglect of duty towards, any 
idiot, lunatic or insane person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Laws of Utah, 1876, Ch. XI, Sec. 193. Current law codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-12-223 (1989) is to the same effect: 
Anyone having care of a mentally ill person who 
unduly restrains that person, either with or without 
authority, or who treats that person with wanton severity 
or cruelty, or in any way abuses that person, is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor, in addition to liability in an 
action for damages, or subject to other criminal charges. 
Recognition of the treatment needs of the mentally ill 
continues to the present day. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89 (1991) 
provides " [t]he board of county commissioners of each county shall 
provide mental health services in accordance with Chapter 12, Title 
62A, and substance abuse services in accordance with Chapter 8, 
Title 62A." 
The objectives of the state hospital and other mental 
health facilities shall be to care for all persons within 
this state who are subject to the provisions of this 
part; and to furnish them with the proper attendance, 
medical treatment, seclusion, rest, restraint, amusement, 
occupation, and support that is conducive to their 
physical and mental well-being, 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992). 
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This statutory scheme requires that the State do more 
than stabilize mentally ill offenders and ship them off to prison. 
"The moral test of government is how it treats those who are in the 
dawn of life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, 
the aged; and those who are in the shadows of life, the sick, the 
needy and the handicapped." Arnold v. Dep't of Health Services, 
775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989) (quoting Hubert Humphrey). Arnold 
was a class action challenging breaches of statutory duties by the 
state and county in providing mental health care to indigent 
chronically mentally ill citizens. The Arizona Supreme Court 
affirmed a judgment in favor of the class.14 
Utah has fared no better than Arizona in providing mental 
health care to its citizens: 
This state has failed dramatically in its moral 
obligation to provide adequate support systems for adults 
disabled by mental retardation, as well as by mental 
illness, who enter the criminal justice system. I wish 
to underscore the point made by Justice Stewart in 
referring to the 1965 report of the Governor's Advisory 
Committee on Mental Retardation. Our laws in this area 
are useless and archaic, and our policies do not prevent 
injustice. It is hoped that the legislature will respond 
to this need. 
State v. Murphv, 760 P.2d 280, 289 (Utah 1988) (Durham, J., 
concurring). 
Finally, it is unfortunate, as Justice Durham 
suggests, that the state has largely ignored the problems 
presented by the fact that a significant number of people 
entering the criminal justice system suffer from mental 
illness or retardation. While mandatory incarceration 
and ever-longer sentences are politically popular, 
14The Court is referred to the Appendix in Arnold, 775 P. 2d at 
538-9, which describes Arizona cases demonstrating the cost to 
society of inadequate mental health care. 
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spending money to adequately house those confined, much 
less treat those suffering from mental problems, is not. 
Until we as a society face up to the true consequences of 
the penal policies adopted in our name, the courts will 
continue to be confronted with agonizingly difficult 
cases such as this one. 
Id. at 290 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).15 
Mr. Dall is seriously at risk for decompensating if 
transferred to the prison. As a sex offender with odd behavior and 
irrational thinking that impacts negatively on his ability to 
interact and relate with others, he is an unusual risk for 
victimization at the prison. Mr. Dall does not respond to others 
in a logical fashion, and unwittingly provokes others to the point 
of anger. Sent, at 21, 39. 
While antipsychotic medication may favorably impact on 
Mr. Dall, it does not impact his pronounced inability to interact 
with others. The State has not shown that the prison can 
adequately meet Mr. Dall's needs, or protect Mr. Dall from other 
15The Settlement Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand indicates that, 
when forced, the State has made some progress. The Court should 
nots that the settlement doesn't contemplate compliance until at 
least the fall of 1994. See Settlement at 22 (two year compliance 
from court approval), 31 (settlement entered by parties on 
September 8, 1992). The settlement does allow for early 
compliance, but the State has presented no evidence that full 
compliance has yet been achieved. 
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inmates.16 Under these circumstances, the order of the PSRB would 
inflict cruel and unusual punishment on Mr. Dall. 
POINT IV. THE PSRB'S ACTION IS AN UNLAWFUL 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT IN 
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Prior to creation of the PSRB, sentencing of mentally ill 
offenders was governed by U.R.Cr.P. 21.5 (1989).17 This rule 
provided the sentencing court with several options. The court 
could order hospitalization, with reviews at least every six 
months. In accordance with the law in effect prior to July 1, 
1989, this is what Judge Hanson intended to do with Mr. Dall. See 
Sent, at 43, 63-70. "Upon a review hearing, to be commenced prior 
to the expiration of the previous order, an order of 
hospitalization may be made for an indeterminate period if the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required 
conditions of Subsection (4) will continue for an indeterminate 
period.ff Rule 21.5(5) , U.R.Cr.P. (1989) . If such an indeterminate 
16Mr. Verville testified that individuals with Mr. Dall's 
specific diagnosis could be housed anywhere within the prison. R. 
688. The acute care facility for mentally ill offenders, which 
provides separation from the general prison population, only has 28 
beds. R.685. Mr. Verville also testified that the Utah State 
Hospital has a patient/staff ratio of 1.8. The Settlement 
Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand indicates total mental health 
staffing of 22 (Stipulation at 12-3) for a mentally ill inmate 
populat ion of 300 (per Mr. Verville, R. 676) to 450 (per 
Stipulation at 3, 13 (15% of population mentally ill, inmate 
population of 3000)). The patient/staff ratio in the prison is 
thus somewhere in the range of 13.6 to 20.5, or 7 to 11 times 
greater than Mr. Verville testified. 
17This was the law in effect at the time of commission of Mr. 
Dall's offense. 
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commitment is ordered by the Judge, then discharge from the 
hospital is governed by Rule 21.5(8) (providing for hospital 
recommendation of discharge to be transmitted to Board of Pardons). 
The sentencing court could decline to commit an offender to the 
jurisdiction of the hospital (with its concomitant possibility of 
transfer from the hospital to the Board of Pardons) by continuing 
semi-annual reviews. 
In Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 227 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 35 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
"the establishment of an original parole release date is inherently 
a sentencing function." The Supreme Court held that fundamental 
principles of due process thus apply. Similarly, the function 
performed by the PSRB was inherently a sentencing function properly 
within the ambit of the judicial branch of government. 
In creating the PSRB, the legislature delegated this 
judicial function of monitoring, determining if hospitalization 
continues to be appropriate, and determining if an offender should 
be sent to prison from the judiciary to the PSRB.18 This improper 
delegation violates the doctrine of separation of powers: 
[E]ver since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2. L.Ed. 
60, it has been recognized that one department of the 
government cannot control the judgment or official acts 
of another department, acting within its proper sphere of 
governmental power, within the scope of its authority. 
. . . But an act which is not within the scope and duty 
of executive power, even though and when attempted or 
18Now, Utah law again allows the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction over an offender sentenced to the State Hospital. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1) (b) (Supp. 1993). Mr. Dall thus 
falls within a limited group of offenders where the judge was 
denied this discretion. 
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performed by an executive body, may be annulled or 
prohibited by the judicial branch. For the executive 
bodies, like the individual persons making up the 
sovereign people can lawfully exercise only the rights 
and powers recognized by law as existing in them. 
Mulcahv v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 117 P.2d 298, 299-300 (Utah 1941). 
In Berkey v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 670 P.2d 1061 
(Or. App. 1983), a challenge was made to the constitutionality of 
the delegation of judicial power from the Oregon circuit courts to 
the Oregon PSRB. In affirming the delegation, the court stated: 
Delegation of adjudicatory powers to administrative 
agencies is valid if judicial review is provided at some 
stage of the proceeding. 
Id. at 1064. In this case, the delegation of power from Utah 
district courts to the PSRB cannot stand. Mr. Dall has been 
provided no opportunity for judicial review. He attempted to 
appeal the PSRB's decision, but the appeal was dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds. 
Asbury v. Lombardi. 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. banc 1993) 
is to the same effect: 
The exercise of judicial functions by executive 
agencies is consistent with traditional concepts of the 
separation of powers. The quintessential power of the 
judiciary is the power to make final determinations of 
questions of law. Marburv v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 
137, 2 L,Ed, 60 (1803); [other cites]. This power is a 
nondelegable power resting exclusively with the 
judiciary. The legislature "has no authority to create 
any other tribunal and invest it with judiciary power." 
[cite] Thus, while the legislature may allow for 
judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making by legislative 
or executive (administrative) agencies, it may not 
preclude judicial review of those decisions. Nor may the 
legislature alter the principal power of the judiciary to 
make the final review. Short of these two 
considerations, however, there will not customarily be 
found a violation of the separation of powers clause. 
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(Footnote omitted.). Asbury held the provisions for appeal from 
decisions of the Personnel Advisory Board to be unconstitutional as 
violative of the separation of powers clause of the Missouri 
Constitution. 
Utah case law is in accord. See White River Shale Oil 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Utah 1985) 
(procedures for rehearings and for application for writ of 
certiorari provided adequate procedural safeguards to sustain 
delegation of power); Carlsen v. State Dep't of Social Services, 
722 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah 1986) ("When a quasi-judicial function has 
been delegated by statute to the administrative body charged with 
the responsibility of enforcing the statute, plaintiff does not 
have a constitutional right to insist that the agency may only 
bring an action in court. He was afforded an opportunity to 
present his claims and defenses to the district court judge [on 
appeal] . . .") . 
As originally enacted, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) 
provided: 
(6) When a person over whom the board exercises 
jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by a 
final order of the board, that person is entitled to 
judicial review of the final order by the Court of 
Appeals only if the court finds, based upon a review of 
the evidence contained in the record, that there is no 
substantial evidence that supports the conclusion of the 
board, or that the board's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. If judicial review is granted, the person is 
entitled to counsel. If the person is indigent, counsel 
shall be appointed in accordance with Chapter 32 of this 
title. 
This section was amended to provide " [w] hen a person over whom the 
board exercises jurisdiction* «&o h&& &$&& &d3u$ie&t$ci &n& £QWX3L to 
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be «ot guilty by reason of insanity, is adversely affected or 
aggrieved ..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13, 
1990) (red-lined form). This amendment completely eliminated Mr. 
Dall's right of judicial review. 
No judicial officer has determined that the prison is 
appropriate for Mr. Dall. To the contrary, Judge Hanson expressly 
found that he was "not going to throw him into that den of 
in[iquity] out there." Sent, at 68. The PSRB sentenced Mr. Dall 
to prison for the first time, without opportunity for judicial 
review. A habeas corpus action under U.R.C.P. 65B is not the 
review the constitution contemplates. "It is not a substitute for 
and cannot properly be treated as a regular appellate review." 
Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968) (citing Price v. 
Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356); accord 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) . Without regular 
appellate review, the PSRB runs afoul of the separation of powers 
clause in Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. The 
PSRB's order cannot stand. 
POINT V. THE LACK OF AN APPEAL RIGHT FROM 
ORDERS OF THE PSRB VIOLATES MR. PALL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I. 
SECTIONS 7 AND 12, AND ARTICLE VIII, 
SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The lack of an appeal right from PSRB orders violates due 
process under federal and state constitutions, and the right to 
appeal under Article I, section 12 and Article VIII, section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution. The Utah Constitution mandates that Mr. 
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Dall be granted an appeal. As originally enacted, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-38-2(6) did provide a right to appeal, complete with court 
appointed counsel if necessary. The March 13, 1990 amendments to 
§ 77-38-2(6) eliminated this appeal right except for persons "found 
not guilty by reason of insanity." Absent this fundamental right 
of appeal, the PSRB procedures violate due process and the 
constitutional right to appeal. The order of the PSRB must be 
vacated. 
POINT VI. THE PSRB'S DENIAL OF COMPULSORY 
PROCESS AND FINANCIAL ACCESS TO EXPERT 
TESTIMONY VIOLATED MR. PALL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTIONS 7 AND 12 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Dall's PSRB hearing was a "critical stage" of his 
case. "The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of 
the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he 
may have no right to object to a particular result of the 
sentencing process." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 
S.Ct. 1197, , 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977). The legislature itself 
recognized the importance of PSRB proceedings by requiring access 
to counsel when PSRB orders are appealed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-
2(6) (prior to March 13, 1990 amendments) . Obviously, if an appeal 
of a PSRB order is a critical stage, the hearing leading to that 
order is also a critical stage. 
Fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an 
adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the 
adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 
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2437, , 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 353 (1974). "[W]hen the State has made 
the defendant's mental condition relevant . . . to the punishment 
he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be 
crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense." Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087, , 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 64 
(1985) . 
The PSRB hearing was specifically addressed to the 
question of the proper facility to house Mr. Dall. The nature of 
his punishment and severity of his incarceration were directly 
implicated. As of that time, no judicial or other entity had 
determined that prison was appropriate for Mr. Dall. He was 
entitled to a fair opportunity to present his case. Mr. Dall 
wanted to call Dr. Breck LeBegue to testify on his behalf, but was 
not afforded the opportunity. Compare February 25, 1991 letter 
(requesting compulsory process and funding for expert testimony) 
(exhibit 7 at evidentiary hearing, attached as Addendum E) with 
June 28, 1991 PSRB hearing transcript (Exhibit 1; only Dr. Washburn 
called, Mr. Dall called no experts or other witnesses, as he could 
not afford to pay Dr. LeBegue for expert testimony). The failure 
of the PSRB to provide Mr. Dall the means of presenting his case 
require that the PSRB's order be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
In making its order, the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board illegally applied an arbitrary and capricious and ex post 
facto "maximum benefit" standard, rather than the proper standards 
found in § 77-16-5 and § 62A-12-241. The lack of a right of appeal 
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violates Mr. Dall's constitutional right to an appeal, and causes 
the delegation of judicial power to the PSRB to violate the 
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution. Denial of 
compulsory process and financial means to obtain expert testimony 
likewise violates Mr. Dall's constitutional rights. The order of 
the PSRB cannot stand, and should be vacated. Mr. Dall should be 
returned to the State Hospital.19 
19If Mr. Dall prevails here, a question is raised over who 
properly has jurisdiction. Appellant asserts that his case should 
be referred to Judge Hanson for a review of sentence. See 
petitioner's Pre-Hearing Memorandum at 6-7, R. 288-323 at 293-4: 
Jurisdiction over Mr. Dall passed from the trial court to 
the PSRB pursuant to the judge's sentencing order dated August 10, 
1989. The PSRB initiated transfer proceedings by holding its 
evidentiary hearings and entering its orders, but no transfer to 
the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons was ever consummated. The 
order entered provided: 
Until such time as the Board of Pardons 
conducts a hearing and custody is assumed by the Board of 
Pardons, Kirk Wesley Dall shall remain in the custody of 
the Utah State Hospital. 
The order entered was an illegal application of an ex 
post facto law, and therefore can have no effect. . . . Utah R. 
Crim. P. 21.5(6) (1993) governed transfer from the PSRB. This 
section expressly provides that mentally ill offenders remain under 
the jurisdiction of the PSRB until the Board of Pardons takes 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5(e) (effective March 13, 1990) is 
to the same effect. 
For all these reasons, the PSRB retained jurisdiction 
over Mr. Dall up to the time the PSRB ceased to exist on July 1, 
1992. When the PSRB ceased to exist, it is unclear where 
jurisdiction in Mr. Dall reverted. Mr. Dall asserts that the only 
logical place for jurisdiction to revert is back to the sentencing 
trial court. The trial court is the only other entity that ever 
had jurisdiction over Mr. Dall, and is the entity that had 
jurisdiction immediately prior to the PSRB. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 1994. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
R. MOFI^
 r 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered to 
James H. Beadles, Attorney General's Office, 330 South 300 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2nd day of June, 1994. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this } day of June, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
August 10, 1989 Sentence 
Tmra Judfdal Otaer 
JASES C. BHADSHAff, #3753 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALS SAKE £ECAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Telephone r 532-5444 
ZS THE DISTRICT COUBT OF THE THL3D JUDICIAL DISTSICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTT, STATS OF UTAH 
TEE STATE OF UTAH/ z ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. i 
KT2K ff- DALL, : Case No. 88139IS95FS 
JUDGE THK3TET R. HANSON 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled setter came on for hearing on the 28th 
of July, 1589. The defendant appearing with counsel, JANES C. 
BEADSHAW, and the State represented by TON VU2J1. 
After hearing the testimony of Dr. Srecic LeSegue, Monica 
Ebert, and reviewing the written opinion letter of the Utah State 
Sospital the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence? 
1} That the defendant, Kirk W. Dail, suffers from a mental 
disease or defect as defined in 576-2-305. 
2} That because of his mental illness the defendant poses 
a danger to others if placed in a probational setting. 
3) That because of the defendant's mental condition, there 
is a serious risk that he will be harmed or killed if he is put in 
the Utah State Prison. 
4) That the dangers outl ined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above 
are immediate in the sense contemplated by the p o l i c i e s and goa l s of 
t h e G u i l t y and Mentally 111 s t a t u t e and as ar t i cu la ted in s t a t e r . 
Cooeland, 765 9 .2d 1166 (Utah 1388 J • 
5) That the Utah State Hospital i s an adequate and 
appropr ia te f a c i l i t y to meet the defendant's care and treatment 
needs . 
Based upon the foregoing f indings the Court orders that the 
defendant be committed to the jur i sd i c t ion of the Psychiatric 
S e c u r i t y Review Board to be placed in the Utah State Sospital where 
he I s t o undergo any or a l l treatment that i s deemed appropriate • 
DAIZD t h i s /0 day of Augustf> 1389 • 
BTyTEK\CTUKt: 
/TUCG2 TUiOTHT 2T-2AilS0H 
/ t h i r d D i s t r i c t Cour; 
DELIVSSED a copy of the foregoing Co the Office of the Sa l t 
Cake Country Attorney, 231 East: 400 Souta, Sa l t Lake City, titan 84111 
thLs _ _ _ _ day of August, 1989. 
• zsmpf W<*T "Has io * THUS GCPV SIT A. 
czusNAL oocuMerr a * sue I N THE TKZZ 
otSwHcr c3Ufrr.SACTtxkscownr. STATS ~ 
UTAH. / 7 _^y 
Co-p^t* ps*jj4fcu&^ *7^*cw Sc^</ "=V>vt 
ADDENDUM B 
April 24, 1991 PSRB Order 
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD 
Social Services Bldg. 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)538-4504 
ORDER OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD, STATE OF UTAH 
Kirk Wesley Dall) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
On August 10, 1989, the above-named defendant, having been 
found guilty and mentally ill, was committed by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to the Utah State Prison for a 
period of not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years for 
forcible sexual abuse and for a period of not less than one (1) or 
more than fifteen (15) years for kidnapping to be served 
concurrently. On that date the defendant was ordered hospitalized 
at the Utah State Hospital and placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
S77-35-21.5. 
On December 17, 1990, the Utah State Hospital petitioned the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board to hold a statutory hearing on 
Kirk Wesley Dall to determine whether placement outside of the Utah 
State Hospital was appropriate. The hearing was set for January 
18, 1991. 
On January 17, 1991, Mr. Dall's defense attorney, requested a 
continuance. The hearing was rescheduled for February 15, 1991. 
On February 8, 1991, Mr. Dall's attorney informed the Board that he 
would not be able to make the hearing on February 15, 1991. The 
hearing was continued to March 15, 1991. On March 15, 1991, a 
hospital staff witness necessary to Mr. Dall's case did not appear. 
The case was continued until April 19, 1991. 
On April 19, 1991, Kirk Wesley Dall appeared before the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board. He was represented by James 
Bradshaw, from the Legal Defender's Office; the State was 
represented by Jeff Hunt. Upon a complete review of the records 
and an interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from 
treatment at the Hospital and that custody should be transferred to 
the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
THEREFORE, THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD ORDERS THAT KXRK 
WESLEY DALL BE DISCHARGED FROM THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AND THAT HE 
BE REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD 
OF PARDONS. 
Recommendation to the Board of Pardons: It is recommended by 
the Board that Mr. Dall's psychotropic medications be continued. 
Until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and 
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons, Kirk Wesley Dall shall 
remain in the custody of the Utah State Hospital. 
Dated this 24th day of April, 1991. 
&/yK$tiUHt 0M-Psychiatric Security Review Board 
Chairman 
ADDENDUM C 
July 2, 1991 PSRB Order 
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVTEW BOARD 
Social Services Bldg. 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)538-4504 
ORDER OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD, STATE OF UTAH 
Kirk Wesley Dall) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
On August 10, 1989, the above-named defendant, having been 
found guilty and mentally ill, was committed by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to the Utah State Prison for a 
period of not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years for 
forcible sexual abuse and for a period of not less than one (1) or 
more than fifteen (15) years for kidnapping to be served 
concurrently. On that date the defendant was ordered hospitalized 
at the Utah State Hospital until the completion of his sentence or 
until the Psychiatric Security Review Board deemed otherwise 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated S77-35-21.5. 
On December 17, 1990, the Utah State Hospital petitioned the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board to hold a statutory hearing on 
Kirk Wesley Dall to determine whether placement outside of the Utah 
State Hospital was appropriate. The hearing was set for January 18, 
1991. 
On January 17, 1991, Mr. Dall's defense attorney, requested a 
continuance. The hearing was rescheduled for February 15, 1991. 
Mr. Dall's attorney was unable to make the hearing in February and 
the hearing was rescheduled for March 15, 1991. On March 15, 1991, 
a hospital staff witness necessary to Mr- Dall's case did not 
appear. The case was continued until April 17, 1991. 
On April 17, 1991, Kirk Wesley Dall appeared before the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board. He was represented by James 
Bradshaw, from the Legal Defender's Office; the State was 
represented by Jeff Hunt. Upon a complete review of the records 
and an* interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received mffxtTrmm benefit from 
treatment at the Hospital and that custody should be transferred to 
the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
Mr. Bradshaw appealed the findings of the Board on June 3, 
1991. At that time it was discovered that the tape recorder had 
failed to record the hearing. The defense attorney and the 
attorney representing the State were unable to reach an agreement 
upon the content of the hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for 
June 28, 1991. 
On June 28, 1991, after a complete review of the records and 
an interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found again by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from 
treatment at the Utah State Hospital and that custody should be 
transferred to the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
THEREFORE, THE PSYCHTATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD ORDERS THAT KIRK 
WESLEY DALL BE DISCHARGED FROM THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AND THAT HE 
BE REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD 
OF PARDONS. 
Until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and 
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons, Kirk Wesley Oall shall 
remain in the custody of the Utah State Hospital • 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 1991. 
PSychiatrlc Security Review Board 
Copies sent to: Mr. Bradshaw, Mr. Hunt, the Board of Pardons, the 
Appellate Court 
ADDENDUM D 
January 17, 1991 letter 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
Established in 1965 
JOHN HILL 
Okmaot 
OARO OF TRUSTEES 
IMIMITSUNAGA 
Chavmm 
L GILBERT ATHAY 
IARVIN W. OAVIS 
IONEL H. FRANKEL 
OSEPH A. GETER 
AY GROUSSMAN 
TEVUART HANSON. JR. 
ON HINOE 
0 CAROL NESSET-SALE 
OHN O'CONNELL 
IRANTH. PALMER January 17, 1991 
Ms. Cheryl Hansen 
Administrative Assistant 
Psychiatric Review Board 
120 North 200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Dear Ms. Hansen: 
I hereby request permission to appear before the 
Psychiatric Review Board on behalf of Mr. Kirk Dall. However, I 
would request that the matter set for January 18, 1991 be continued 
so that I might have adequate time to address the relevant issues. 
I have spoken with Mr. Dall and he is in full support of both my 
representation and my request to continue the matter. 
In the short time I have considered this matter I have had 
some difficulty in finding the standards which will be applied at 
Mr. Dall.'s hearing. I would request that the guidelines the board 
will use in determining whether the defendant should remain in the 
hospital be provided to me prior to Mr. Oall's hearing. 
Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated. 
JCB:ejo 
ADDENDUM E 
February 25, 1991 letter 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
Established in 1965 
F. JOHN HILL 
Director 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
JIM! MITSUNAGA 
Charman 
0. GILBERT ATHAY 
MARVIN W. OAVIS 
UONEL H. FRANKEL 
JOSEPH A. GETER 
RAY GROUSSMAN 
STEWART HANSON. JR. 
LON HINOE 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
GRANT H. PALMER 
February 25, 1991 
Ms* Cheryl Hansen 
Psychiatric Security Review Board 
125 North 200 West 
3rd Floor 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84103 
RE: Kirk Dall 
Dear Us. Hansen: 
In preparing for the upcoming hearing before the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board it appears to me that there will 
be a need for Mr. Dall to retain experts to testify on his behalf at 
the hearing. I would specifically request that Dr. Breck LeBegue 
and Dr. Vickie Gregory be appointed to offer independant evidence on 
the defendant's mental status and his prognosis. I am concerned 
about the independence of the hospital experts in light of the 
obvious overcrowding at the hospital. 
It is my opinion that Mr. Dall's appearance before the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board is a "critical stage" in the 
proceedings against him and accordingly he should be entitled the 
fundamental rights guaranteed a criminal defendant under the Utah 
State and United states Constitutions. Accordingly, I am formally 
requesting appointment, and payment by the State, of all costs 
associated with the retention of independant experts. Drs. Gregory 
and LeBegue both presented evidence at the time Kirk appeared before 
Judge Hansen for determination of whether he qualified as guilty and 
mentally ill. Your promptest response to this request would be 
greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely*/ 
fJAMES C. BRADSHAW 
ibrney at Law 
JCBrejo 
ADDENDUM F 
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions 
Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; 
coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold 
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any 
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing 
the obligations of contracts, or grant any title of 
nobility. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Bail -- Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 9 [Excessive bail and fines -- Cruel punishments] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec, 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 18. [Attainder --Ex post facto laws -- Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in 
the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts 
-- Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and 
appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for 
matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there 
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court 
of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89 (1991) provides: 
17-5-89. Mental health and substance abuse services. 
The board of county commissioners of each 
county shall provide mental health services in accordance 
with Chapter 12, Title 62A, and substance abuse services 
in accordance with Chapter 8, Title 62A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992) provides: 
62A-12-209. Objectives of state hospital and other 
facilities -- Persons who may be admitted to state 
hospital. 
(1) The objectives of the state hospital and other 
mental health facilities shall be to care for all persons 
within this state who are subject to the provisions of 
this part; and to furnish them with the proper 
attendance, medical treatment, seclusion, rest, 
restraint, amusement, occupation, and support that is 
conducive to their physical and mental well-being. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-229 (Supp. 1992) provides: 
62A-12-229. Release from commitment. 
(3) When the patient has been committed to the 
division under judicial proceedings, the division shall 
use the procedures described in Sections 62A-12-240 and 
62A-12-241. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-223 (1989) provides: 
62A-12-223. Abuse of mentally ill persons -- Criminal 
and civil liability. 
Anyone having care of a mentally ill person who 
unduly restrains that person, either with or without 
authority, or who treats that person with wanton severity 
or cruelty, or in any way abuses that person, is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor, in addition to liability in an 
action for damages, or subject to other criminal charges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992) provides: 
62A-12-240. Periodic review and discharge. 
The director or his designee shall, as 
frequently as practicable, examine or cause to be 
examined every person committed to the division. 
Whenever the director or his designee determines that the 
conditions justifying involuntary commitment no longer 
exist, he shall discharge the patient. If the patient 
has been committed through judicial proceedings, a report 
describing that determination shall be sent to the clerk 
of the court where the proceedings were held. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992) provides: 
62A-12-241. Release of patient to receive other 
treatment -- Placement in more restrictive environment --
Procedures• 
(1) The director or his designee may release an 
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be 
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to 
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his 
designee determines that the conditions justifying 
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be 
discharged. If the patient has been committed through 
judicial proceedings, a report describing that 
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court 
where the proceedings were held. 
(2) (a) The director or his designee is 
authorized to issue an order for the immediate 
placement of a patient not previously released 
from an order of commitment into a more 
restrictive environment, if the director or his 
designee has reason to believe that the less 
restrictive environment in which the patient has 
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental 
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234 (10) , 
or that the patient has failed to comply with the 
specified treatment plan to which the patient had 
agreed in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (1990) provided: 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or 
defect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or 
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a 
physical or mental disease Mental illness does not mean 
a personality or character disorder or abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) provides: 
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person -- Certification 
to Board of Pardons. 
(1) A person committed to the state hospital after 
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental 
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of 
Pardons by the clinical director. 
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person 
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall 
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for 
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with 
credit for time served while confined at the hospital. 
The certification of the clinical director of the 
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical 
facts justifying his certification. 
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding 
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state 
hospital. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990) 
(repealed July 1, 1992) provided: 
77-16a-5. Discharge from psychiatric Security Review 
Board -- Board of Pardons -- Parole -- Review. 
With regard to mentally ill but not mentally retarded 
persons: 
(1) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board shall review the condition of each 
person under its jurisdiction at the state 
hospital, to determine whether custody should be 
transferred to the Board of Pardons. 
(2) (a) If at any time after commitment of a 
person to the hospital under Section 77-16a-4 
whose sentence has not expired, if the 
superintendent of the hospital, or his 
designee, is of the opinion that the person: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill, or (ii) is 
still mentally ill and continues to be a 
danger to himself or others, but can be 
controlled if proper care, medication, and 
treatment are provided, and, in either case, 
(iii) has reached maximum benefit from the 
programs at the hospital, the superintendent 
or his designee shall apply to the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board for a transfer of 
custody to the Board of Pardons. 
(b) The application shall be accompanied by 
a report setting forth the facts supporting 
the opinion of the superintendent or his 
designee, which shall include the clinical 
facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment 
received at the hospital, the prognosis of the 
remission of the symptoms, the potential for 
recidivism and the danger to himself or 
others, and the recommendations for future 
treatment. If the recommendations included in 
the application involve treatment in the 
community under conditions of parole or 
conditional release, the application must also 
be accompanied by a verified plan of 
treatment. 
(3) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board proposes to transfer custody of a 
defendant from the Utah State Hospital to the 
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of 
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of 
Pardons a report on the condition of the 
defendant, including all pertinent information 
supplied by the superintendent or his 
designee. 
(b) The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
may make recommendations to the Board of 
Pardons as follows: 
(i) that the defendant serve any or 
all of his unexpired term of sentence at 
the state prison; 
(ii) that the defendant be placed on 
parole; or 
(iii) that the defendant be 
recommitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board for 
conditional release in accordance with 
Chapter 38 of this title. 
(c) If the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board recommends to the Board of Pardons that 
a defendant be placed on parole or be placed 
under its jurisdiction for conditional 
release, it shall submit with that 
recommendation a specific program for the 
care, custody, and treatment of the defendant. 
If the defendant is placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board by the Board of Pardons for 
conditional release, failure to complete that 
program shall be grounds for revocation of 
conditional release in accordance with Chapter 
38 of this title. 
(d) The Board of Pardons shall direct that 
the defendant serve any or all of the 
unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah 
State Prison, place the defendant on parole, 
or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board for 
conditional release in accordance with Chapter 
38. 
(e) Pending action of the Board of Pardons, 
the defendant shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board at the Utah State Hospital. 
(4) (a) If the defendant is placed on parole, 
treatment shall, upon the recommendation of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be made 
a condition of parole. Failure to continue 
treatment or other condition of parole except 
by agreement with the designated mental health 
services provider and the Board of Pardons is 
a basis for initiation of parole violation 
hearings by the Board of Pardons. 
(b) The period of parole may not be for 
fewer than five years or until the expiration 
of the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs 
first, and may not be reduced without 
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a 
current report on the mental health status of 
the offender. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (3) (a) (effective July 
1992) provides: 
77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill persons 
committed to department -- Recommendations for 
transfer. 
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC 
medical administrator, and the board's mental 
health adviser that a mentally ill offender is 
eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team 
finds that the offender: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to 
be a danger to himself or others, but can be 
controlled if adequate care, medication, and 
treatment are provided, and that he has reached 
maximum benefit from the programs within the 
department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (as amended March 13, 19 
(red-lined form) (repealed July 1, 1992) provided: 
(6) When a person over whom the board exercises 
jurisdiction, who has bean adjudicated and found to be 
ftfirit guilty by x«ft6an of ins&nlty, is adversely affected 
or aggrieved by a final order of the board, that: person 
is entitled to judicial review of the final order by the 
Court of Appeals only if the court finds, based upon a 
review of the evidence contained in the record, that 
there is no substantial evidence that supports the 
conclusion of the board, or that the board's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. If judicial review is granted, 
the person is entitled to counsel. If the person is 
indigent, counsel shall be appointed in accordance with 
Chapter 32 of this title. 
